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Abstract 
In their commentary, Meyer, Otgaar, and Smeets (2015) raise several important issues 
about the definitions, characteristics and applications of various involuntary cognitive 
phenomena. Here we respond to the comments of Meyer et al. in ways that we hope will 
advance understanding of these issues, and inform future research. In particular, we have 
focused on the characteristics of involuntary phenomena—particularly in relation to 
meta-awareness—and the clinical relevance of mind-wandering. 
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Meta-awareness and the Involuntary Memory Spectrum: Reply to Meyer, Otgaar, and 
Smeets (2015). 
Meyer, Otgaar, and Smeets (2015) extended Kvavilashvili’s (2014) provocative and 
potentially important idea of an involuntary memory spectrum by adding mind-
wandering to the lower end of a spectrum running from involuntary memories to 
intrusive memories to traumatic flashbacks. One fascinating question, with no clear 
empirical answer to date, is whether it is possible to have a flashback without meta-
awareness that one is having a flashback. Meyer et al. suggested, and we agree, that it 
may be possible. However, Meyer et al. also argued that “PTSD re-experiencing 
symptoms… do not include phenomena akin to unnoticed intrusions” (p. 25) because 
they are established by retrospective questioning (e.g., structured 
interviews, questionnaires), which requires retrospective meta-awareness.  
But, becoming aware of a thought after it occurs does not mean a person was meta-
aware at the time the thought appeared in consciousness. By definition, mind-wandering 
without awareness is established retrospectively (if at all; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). 
Indeed, a lack of meta-awareness might well be a hallmark of the most extreme form of 
flashback, in which the individual appears not to be having an experience of 
remembering but rather one of re-living.  
We suspect that unnoticed intrusions are not always established via retrospective 
meta-awareness. On the contrary, we suspect that people are frequently reminded of past 
episodes without becoming meta-aware of such reminders (see Hintzman, 2011). It seems 
plausible to us that people may ruminate without being meta-aware that they are 
ruminating. Hence, we disagree with the idea that for a thought to be considered 
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involuntary and/or unwanted it must be noticed as such. We thus also do not agree with 
the assertion that “trauma-film intrusions require meta-awareness” (p. 25). 
Meyer et al. (2014) argued that mind-wandering involves a “smooth transition” from 
thinking about the ongoing task to thinking about something else. Although an interesting 
possibility, we do not know of any relevant data. To us it seems likely that the onset of 
mind-wandering is often abrupt: one moment a person is consciously engaged with the 
intended task and the next moment they are daydreaming, ruminating, etc., and only at 
some later point do they become meta-aware of that shift. Our intuitions suggest that the 
onset of meta-awareness itself is abrupt, but intuition can be mistaken. Further, it is 
interesting to speculate about the possibility that the underlying processes that give rise to 
trauma-related intrusions are gradual, yet trauma-exposed people subjectively experience 
them as a “sudden popping to mind” (see Bowers, Farvolden & Mermigis, 1995). In 
short, we are not convinced that the suddenness of occurrence reliably differentiates 
“mind-wandering” from “intrusions.”  
Meyer et al. described the intrusive thoughts subjects report in relation to a trauma 
analogue as verbal, in contrast to flashbacks, which they characterized as 
perceptual. Although it seems likely that memories of an analogue film and trauma 
memories do differ in terms of their average perceptual richness or intensity, anyone who 
has experienced intrusive images from a horror film knows that those intrusions are not 
necessarily verbal. In addition, trauma-exposed participants sometimes do report 
intrusive verbal thoughts (e.g., Ehlers & Steil, 1995). Thus, we suggest that 
differentiating lab-based versus real-world involuntary phenomena on this basis is too 
simplistic.  
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Meyer et al. raised the important question of which of these phenomena are clinically 
relevant. Future work on this topic would benefit from considering how the proposed 
spectrum fits with the nature and function of involuntary and intrusive phenomena, as 
proposed by leading PTSD theorists (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Brewin, 
Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). However, we believe that 
meta-awareness may still play an important clinical role.  For example, it is interesting to 
speculate that an important therapeutic goal might involve a shift in meta-awareness 
toward remembering the horrific experiences with awareness of remembering (such as in 
exposure techniques used in Cognitive Behavior Therapy; Harvey, Bryant & Tarrier, 
2003; and Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing treatment; Shapiro & 
Maxfield, 2002).  
The model proposed by Meyer et al. characterizes mind-wandering without awareness 
as the least disruptive and least negative phenomenon of the proposed spectrum. Meyer et 
al. claimed that the intensity of negative affect is low in mind-wandering. This is an 
empirical question. There is evidence that experiencing negative mood increases the 
likelihood of mind-wandering—in both naturalistic and lab settings (e.g., Killingsworth 
& Gilbert 2010; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011), and that mind-wandering often focuses 
on a “current concern” and mind-wandering on negative content can exacerbate negative 
affect (Poerio, Totterdell, & Miles, 2013). As we have discussed previously (Takarangi, 
Strange & Lindsay, 2014), it is possible that unaware intrusions could have similar 
effects to rumination, which is related to the development of PTSD and is also, like 
intrusive thoughts, a strong feature of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Watkins, 
2008). Indeed, Deng, Li, and Tang (2012) reported that people with more symptoms of 
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depression were more likely to mind-wander without awareness. Taken together, these 
findings suggest that it may be premature to dismiss the link between unaware mind-
wandering and clinical symptoms and disorders; non-meta-aware thoughts could be quite 
disruptive and affect ongoing mood.  
Meyer et al.’s thought provoking commentary leaves us with a number of important 
empirical questions. Transient or permanent failings in meta-awareness raise potential 
limitations and questions relating to the proposed spectrum if phenomena are 
differentiated on the basis of meta-awareness. For example, if mind-wandering becomes 
an “involuntary autobiographical memory” at the point of meta-awareness, do 
involuntary autobiographical memories then represent the same underlying process as 
mind-wandering with awareness?  
In summary, we agree that future research should seek to specify whether the same or 
different mechanisms underlie the different involuntary phenomena and whether they can 
be differentiated on Meyer et al.’s suggested criteria. It may be that the phenomena are 
better captured by an umbrella-style model—rather than a continuum—in which 
unwanted or traumatic intrusions are a subset of involuntary memories, which can be 
positive, negative, or even neutral.  
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